Leonid Hurwicz (1917-2008)
Leonid Hurwicz nasceu em Moscou, Rússia, em 1917, de uma família de judeus poloneses que haviam acabado de chegar como refugiados e faleceu em 2008. Logo depois, sua família retornou a Varsóvia. Formou-se em 1938 pela Universidade de Varsóvia e, em seguida, foi estudar na London School of Economics. Durante a guerra, ele fugiu para a Suíça depois de se mudar para Portugal e os Estados Unidos. Era um cidadão americano. Ele morreu em 24 de junho de 2008, em Minneapolis.
Ele era professor emérito da Universidade de Minnesota.
Leonid Hurwicz ganhou o Prémio Nobel de Economia em 2007, partilhado com Eric S. Maskin e Roger B. Myerson por ter lançado as bases da teoria do desenho de mecanismos.
A teoria do desenho de mecanismos, no contexto da teoria dos jogos é a arte da elaboração de regras para um resultado específico. Ele é estabelecer estruturas que encorajam os jogadores a se comportar de acordo com os objectivos da designer.
Ele era um membro da Academia Nacional de Ciências e da Academia Americana de Artes e Ciências. Ele foi presidente da Sociedade Econométrica.
Principais obras e papers
“Stochastic Models of Economic Fluctuations”, 1944, Econometrica
“The Theory of Economic Behavior”, 1945, AER.
“Theory of the Firm and of Investment”, 1946, Econometrica
“What Has Happened to the Theory of Games?”, AER
“Reduction of Constrained Maxima to Saddle-Point Problems” with K.J.Arrow, 1956, Proceedings of the Third Berkeley Symposium
“Gradient Methods for Constrained Maxima”, with K.J. Arrow, 1957, Operations Research
Studies in Linear and Non-Linear Programming with K.J.Arrow and Hirofumi Uzawa, 1958.
“On the Stability of Competitive Equilibrium I”, with K.J. Arrow, 1958, Econometrica.
“On the Stability of Competitive Equilibrium, II”, with K.J. Arrow, J.D. Block, 1959, Econometrica.
“Competitive Stability under Weak Gross Substitutability: the Euclidian distance approach” with K.J. Arrow, 1960, IER.
“Some Remarks on the Equilibria of Economic Systems” with K.J. Arrow, 1960, Econometrica.
“Conditions for Economic Efficiency of Centralized and Decentralized Structures”, 1960, in Grossman, editor, Value and Plan.
“Optimality and Informational Efficiency in Resource Allocation”, 1960, in Arrow, Karlin and Suppes, editors, Mathematical Methods in Social Sciences.
“Constraint Qualifications in Non-Linear Programming”, with K.J. Arrow and H. Uzawa, 1961, Naval Research Logistics Quarterly
“On the Problem of Integrability of Demand Functions”, 1971, in Chipman et al, editors, Preferences, Utility and Demand.
“On the Integrability of Demand Functions”, with H. Uzawa, 1971, in Chipman et al, editors, Preferences, Utility and Demand.
“Revealed Preference without Demand Continuity Assumptions”, with M.K. Richter, 1971, in Chipman et al, editors, Preferences, Utility and Demand.
“Centralization and Decentralization in Economic Processes”, 1971, in Eckstein, editor, Computation of Economic Systems.
“On Informationally Decentralized Systems”, 1971, in McGuire, and Radner, editors, Decision and Organization.
“The Design of Mechanism for Resource Allocation”, 1973, AER.
Studies in Resource Allocation Processes, with K.J. Arrow, 1977.
“On the Dimensional Requirements of Informationally Decentralized Pareto-Satisfactory Processes”, 1977, JET.
“Ville Axioms and Consumer Theory”, with M.K. Richter, 1978, Econometrica
“Construction of Outcome Functions guaranteeing Existence and Pareto-optimality of Nash Equilibria”, with D. Schmeidler, 1979, Econometrica .
“Outcome Functions Yielding Walrasian and Lindahl Allocations at Nash Equilibrium Points”, 1979, RES.
“On Allocations Attainable through Nash Equilibria”, 1979, JET.
“Incentive Aspects of Decentralization”, 1986, in Arrow and Intriligator, editors, Handbook of Mathematical Econ – Vol. III – intro
“On the Stability of the Tatonnement Approach to Competitive Equilibrium”, 1986, in Sonnenschein, editor, Models of Economic Dynamics
“On the Implementation of Social Choice Rules in Irrational Societies”, 1986, in Heller et al., editors, Essays in Honor of Kenneth J. Arrow, Vol. I
“Discrete allocation mechanisms: Dimensional requirements for resource-allocation mechanisms when desired outcomes are unbounded.”, with T. Marschak, 1985, J of Complexity
“Approximating a function by choosing a covering of its domain and k points from its range”, with T. Marschak, 1988, J of Complexity
“Implementation and Enforcement in Institutional Modeling”, 1993, in Barnett et al., editors, Political Economy
References:
Karier, Thomas (2011). Intellectual Capital – Forty years of the Nobel Prize in Economics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
